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1. Introduction 
 
In January this year, the Economist ran a couple of articles on the sorry state of higher education. One of the articles 
was called “Pay or Decay” (Economist, 2004). It painted a very bleak picture of universities in Britain and 
elsewhere in continental Europe. The message of the article was twofold: (1) students should bear more of the costs 
of bringing them to a university degree, (2) universities should be freed from the burden of state planning and 
regulation. The model propagated by the magazine to fulfill both goals at the same time was one in which 
universities would be free to decide on the level of the tuition fees and the number of students admitted to their 
programs. This message was put across very firmly, even aggressively, and some will disagree with part of the 
evidence used to underpin it. However, one can not deny that there is a lot of truth in the observations that most 
graduates earn significantly more than non-graduates and most students are from families that may be regarded as 
more advantaged than others. It is also very true that while most European universities are overcrowded and 
underfunded, they cannot expect to get any substantial financial relief from the state. Private funding then will have 
to increase because governments face increasing claims on their purse from sectors like health care, security, and 
care for the elderly. 
 
So private money is needed urgently, but in this paper it is argued that one cannot neglect the mechanisms through 
which public subsidies are being allocated to the universities. One cannot expect the solution for higher education’s 
problems to come only from increased student (or graduate) contributions. The mechanisms for public funding 
contain important incentives to achieve higher education’s three main goals, viz. quality, efficiency and equity. 
Bringing these incentives more closely in line with incentives to generate increased private resources for higher 
education would seem to be the goal to be achieved. So, the message of this paper is: it is not just the level of (public 
and private) funding, but it is just as much the basis and criteria according to which public funds are made available 
that can improve the quality and accessibility of higher education.  
 
We will discuss funding mechanisms – funding models – and how they may be classified. Three options for the 
public funding of higher education will be discussed, along with their potential in realizing the goals of generating 
additional private funding and contributing to the goals of efficiency, quality and access. 
 
 
2. Public and private expenditure on higher education 
 
Based on figures presented in the OECD’s Education at a Glance, Graph 1 simultaneously shows total expenditure 
on tertiary education institutions as a percentage of GDP (vertically) and the share of total expenditures that 
originates from non-public source such as students, donations and other non-government sources (horizontally). The 
message implied by the OECD is that those countries that have been able to channel more than 2 per cent of GDP 
into tertiary education – the United States, Korea, Canada, and New Zealand – all raise a substantial share of 
funding from these alternative sources. My own country, the Netherlands, raises one-fifth of spending from private 
sources, which is higher compared to many other OECD countries, but is well below the share in the countries with 
high (i.e. > 2% GDP) total spending on tertiary education.  
 
The OECD suggests that there is room for increased student contributions in many OECD member states – like 
Germany, the UK, and the Scandinavian countries. In particular, in continental Europe often students pay no tuition 
fees at all. In other countries (e.g. the UK, the Netherlands) government offsets the fees by means of grants and 
scholarships. Graph 2 shows the most important resource flows to and from higher education institutions. From the 
figure above, we can identify three main sources of funding for higher education institutions: governments, students 
and households, and other private entities.  Government resources include operational grants (for both teaching and 
research), capital investment and research grants paid directly to institutions. Student payments include tuition fees 
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and charges for ancillary services.1 Other private payments and resources include private donations and gifts, and 
payments for consulting, patents, and other services.  
 
 
Graph 1: Expenditure on tertiary education institutions, 2000 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Resource flows to and from tertiary education institutions 
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Table 1: Tuition fees in selected OECD countries: rates in year 2000 / 2001 (in Euro) 
Country type/sector of higher education Public institutions Private institutions 
  Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Austria Fachhochschule (Ba), Universität (Ba / Ma) 726 726   
Denmark Ba / Ma 0 0   
Finland Ba / Ma 51 86   
Flanders (Belgium) higher vocational education (Bachelor) 50 406   
 university (Ba / Ma) 80 660   
France Université (Ba) 104    
 Université (Ma)  800   
 Grandes Écoles   1,400 5,600 
Germany Universität (Ba/Ma) / Fachhochschule (Ba) “Studentenbeitrag” ± 50   
Ireland University, college 670 670   
Netherlands ‘hogeschool’ (higher vocational education; Ba) 1,302 1,302 1,585 2,950 
 university (Ba / Ma) 1,302 1,302  5,210 
 part-time and ‘slow lane’ students (unis / hogeschool) 1,302 2,605   
 MBA programs   4,500 24,000 
England & Bachelor (UK/EU students) 1,500 1,500   
       Wales Bachelor (non-EU students) 4,860 12,810   
    Master: taught MA (UK/EU students) 
Master: research (UK/EU students) 
3,000  
3,910  
4,500 
4,640 
  
 Master (non-EU students) 7,880 12,920   
 MBA programs average: 14,290   
Scotland Bachelor graduate endowment: 2,840   
Spain university 500 770 
 
 
Sweden Ba / Ma Union fee:  30   
Australia Bachelor (Australian students) 
humanities, social sciences, education, nursing, arts 
economics, natural sciences, engineering, math., IT 
medicine, law 
HECS rates: 
2,076 
2,957 
3,461 
 
 Bachelor (fee-paying Australian students) 
Bachelor (overseas students) 
Master (coursework Ma; Australian students) 
Master (research Ma; Australian students) 
4,500 – 12,500 
7,200 – 14,400 
3,500 – 6,800 
HECS rates 
 
New 
      Zealand 
university (Ba) average: 1,720  
(depending on institution) 
average: 2,400 
(depending on program) 
United  
      States university (Bachelor, 4-year) 
 university (Ma) 
university (first professional degree in Law) 
university (first prof. degree in Medicine) 
average 
2,890 
3,500 
6,670 
9,980 
min – max 
1,260 – 6,930 
 
average 
16,650 
12,030 
18,160 
23,740 
min –max 
13,620 – 21,870 
Source: Jongbloed, B (2004) 
 
 
Earlier this year, the UK government has made proposals, agreed by a vote in Parliament in January 2004, that 
would allow universities to charge up to 3000 per year per student (instead of the current flat-rate at £1125). The 
British universities themselves from the year 2006 on will be free to set the fees. Students will be allowed to borrow 
the money through a state-run loan scheme and pay it back once they are earning enough. The UK bill abolishes the 
current up-front fee. Students will not have to pay a fee, nor will parents, instead the Student Loans Company will 
pay money into the university’s bank account to pay each student’s fees and pays money into the student’s account 
to help him/her meet living costs. A lot can be said about this graduate contributions scheme, but we will leave this 
for others to discuss (see e.g. Barr, 2003). 
 
Table 1 below gives an overview of university fees for a number of OECD countries. Governments can influence the 
level and nature of support they provide to students by regulating the imposition and level of tuition fees. Many 
countries have some form of regulation of domestic undergraduate fees; postgraduate fees are more likely to be 
deregulated. The freedom of universities to levy and set fees varies. In Australia, universities can offer a limited 
number of unregulated fee-paying places to domestic students once they have met their target level of 
Commonwealth funded places. So far, in Australia, tuition fees for HECS-liable places are set at three levels which 
reflect the differing costs of delivering courses and the potential future earning capacity of graduates. However, also 
in Australia, a bill was passed in December last year. The bill has some similarities to the UK Bill in the sense that 
(from the year 2005 on) universities will be free to set the fees for their undergraduate students up to a maximum 
that differs according to the subject group (there are three ‘bands’) in which the program is categorized.  
 
In the Netherlands, government sets domestic fee levels. The same fee applies across all institutions and programs. 
However, as part of a wider white paper, the Dutch parliament recently accepted plans to allow institutions to charge 
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higher fees for programs that provide a demonstrably higher added value to the students. With Austrian and German 
higher education administrators and politicians slowly getting used to the idea of student fees, one can see fees and 
graduate contributions becoming an unavoidable ingredient of higher education systems in continental Europe. 
When the next step – flexible fees – is taken is still unsure. Flexible fees can have beneficial effects, but they will 
have to go hand in hand with a loans system that allows students to defer payment of their fees until after they 
graduate. And to prevent the fear of debt deterring some social economic groups to enroll, the government should 
target some of its efforts (communication and grants) to students from disadvantaged groups in society for whom 
access is fragile. In any case, uniform or flexible, fees will allow the price mechanism to work and achieve a better 
balance between supply and demand for higher education courses.  
 
 
3. Funding mechanisms: a classification 
 
We are now turning to the arrangements for the public funding of higher education. Governments provide direct 
support to universities and colleges. They do this because higher education provides social as well as economic 
benefits. We would like to stress here that the funding of universities is not just for economic reasons; there is no 
proven connection between spending on universities and economic prosperity. Because of the benefits, subsidies are 
channeled to universities on the basis of criteria that are defined in political debates, parliament and – to a large 
extent – dictated by social and economic realities. Where some parliaments would like to achieve a uniform and 
egalitarian higher education landscape, other would like to see a diverse and market-driven system emerge. In other 
words, funding arrangements differ across systems. 
 
For the classification of funding arrangements two questions may be used (Jongbloed & Koelman, 2000): 
(a) ‘what is funded by the government’ and  
(b) ‘how is it funded’?  
 
Question (a) concerns the funding base for the government allocations to higher education institutions: Are the funds 
tied to educational outputs and performance, or rather to inputs? Question (b) relates to the issue of the degree of 
market orientation in the funding arrangements. Whose decisions actually underlie the observed flow of government 
funds to higher education institutions, or: “what drives the system?’ The answer to this question may be found by 
paying attention to issues such as: to what extent are funded numbers or funded (research and degree) programs 
regulated (or planned) by central authorities? And: do higher education institutions compete for funds (i.e. students, 
research programs)? Do they have the right to determine the level of tuition fees by themselves? can they select their 
students? 
 
Question (b) relates to the issue of market orientation in the funding arrangements. One of the characteristics of market 
orientation is the degree of competition implied by the funding decisions. Or stated differently: “are funded student 
numbers or funded (research, degree) programs regulated (or planned) by central authorities or are the funding flows 
driven by the decisions of the clients (students, private firms, research councils/foundations) themselves?” The answer 
to this question may be translated into a measure for the degree of centralisation, from a highly regulated situation in 
which the government determines the funding centrally (for instance by prescribing the exact numbers of students for 
different programs) to a situation in which consumer sovereignty (individual client decisions) drives the system. In 
practical situations, the degree of centralisation (or market orientation) will lie somewhere in between the two 
extremes.  
 
In the graph below, the vertical axis is used for depicting the degree of (de-) centralisation and a horizontal axis for 
expressing the degree to which government are paying for the results (outcomes) instead of the efforts (inputs). We can 
distinguish four quadrants (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) to classify funding arrangements. 
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Graph 3: Four funding systems 
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We will now give a number of examples that relate to the four types of funding.  
 
Q1: planned, input-based funding through providers 
The top-left-hand portion of the diagram represents a centralised system of funding. It shows a more traditional type 
of budgeting, where allocations are based on requests (activity plans; budget proposals) submitted to budgetary 
authorities. This is known as negotiated funding. In this mechanism, the budget allocation is often based on the 
previous year’s allocation of specific budget items. Separate budget items then are negotiated between 
representatives of educational institutions and the funding authorities (i.e. the ministry, or funding council). Annual 
changes (usually increases) in each budget item are treated individually, with discussion taking place on the basis of 
cost projections. In this case, budget items are likely to include categories like staff salaries, material requirements, 
building maintenance costs, and investment. Funding is line item based, and shows the different expenditure items 
as separate lines of the budget. These line items are determined by referring to norms with respect to indicators like 
unit costs (or unit cost rises) or capacity (e.g. funded number of students). 
 
Q2: performance-based funding of providers 
In this example of a performance-based funding system a formula is used that generates funds for institutions that are 
successful in terms of their students passing exams. Depending on the number of credits (i.e. weighted number of 
passed courses) accumulated by their students and the subject categories concerned a budget is flowing to the higher 
education institution. This type of model is operating in Denmark (taximeter model), while in Sweden a mix of 
enrolment numbers and credits determines the funds allocated to higher education institutions. In the Netherlands, a 
mix of the number of first-year students (‘freshmen’) and the number of Master’s degrees conferred determines the 
funds allocated to the universities (see Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2002). Other examples can be found in the UK, 
where research is funded in proportion to a measure of research quality. Research quality is assessed and rated every 
five years (in Research Assessment Exercises). 
 
 
Q3: purpose-specific purchasing from providers 
In this example of a market-oriented funding system, higher education institutions are invited to submit tenders for a 
given supply of graduates or research activities. The tenders that are selected by the funding agency are the ones that 
are the most price-competitive. In this tendering process, higher education institutions are encouraged to compete 
with one another to provide education, training and research to meet national needs. Another example is research 
funds awarded by research councils. The system will make use of contracts that are signed up between the funding 
agency and higher education institutions, with the latter agreeing to deliver graduates for targeted labour market 
needs, or research outputs targeted at strengthening the innovative capacity of the country. When entering into a 
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contract, the funding agency will make sure it obtains the services it wants for a reasonable price. In this way the 
cost-effectiveness of the delivery is stressed. In the contract, both parties express that they will obey certain criteria. 
Only if these criteria are fulfilled, the higher education institution will receive core funding. The criteria may 
concern the types and qualifications of students admitted to the higher education institution, the (maximum) level of 
tuition fees (if any) charged by the institution, and the commitment made by the higher education institution towards 
its students in the instruction and teaching processes. 
 
Q4: demand-driven, input-based funding through clients 
This funding system makes use of vouchers. The core funds of higher education institutions are supplied through the 
clients of higher education institutions. Students obtain vouchers, which can be traded for educational services (i.e. 
educational consumption), at the higher education institution of their own choice. For the higher education institution 
the vouchers represent a certain value - they can be cashed at the Ministry of Education. Each (prospective) student is 
given a limited number of vouchers, representing a value which can be used up in a flexible way (during a certain 
period of time and for programs supplied by a given number of accredited education providers). In this funding system 
it is the consumer that drives the system - the system is demand-driven. The client (student) decides what institution to 
attend and what programs to enrol in. The higher education institutions will have to look after the quality of their 
teaching and their supply of courses, because unattractive programs will not receive sufficient funding. The voucher 
system can be combined - like many other funding variants - with a system of differentiated course fees. The higher 
education institutions then will charge the students a certain percentage of the course costs. Tuition fees may be 
regulated to some extent by the government. Charging fees will make students pay attention to the quality of the service 
they get from the higher education institution. So, combining vouchers and fees may result in a system which is 
responsive to individual students' demand. 
 
trends 
Overlooking the funding mechanisms in place across OECD states, one can observe that governments in a number 
of countries have attempted to separate their support for teaching and research by providing block (i.e. lump sum) 
funding for each activity – covering the day-to-day running costs. There also has been a move away from negotiated 
line item funding (located in quadrant Q1) towards more transparent, rational – formula-based – mechanisms 
(quadrant Q2). Additionally, one can observe the tendency to replace block funding for research to competitive 
funding mechanisms (Q3), or performance-based funding mechanisms (Q2). The extent to which this has been 
achieved varies across countries. In some countries, universities have access to additional funding for specific 
initiatives such as increasing the participation of certain target groups, targeting specific skills areas, postgraduate 
training, setting up research infrastructure, public-private research partnerships, or specific strategic research in 
‘areas of excellence’. In all cases, the allocation of block grants or targeted funds is tied to specific conditions in 
terms of quality and accountability requirements.  
 
If we were to make a summary of international trends in funding mechanisms, the direction in which they are 
developing looks like the one shown by means of the upper arrow (A) in graph 4. Whether developments will lead to 
a more demand-driven system (a further movement along arrow B) remains to be seen. The four quadrants in the 
graph are characterised by means of four names that will reappear in the next section. 
 
 
 Graph 4:  Trends in funding mechanisms 
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4. Options for higher education financing 
 
In debates about the funding of higher education the crucial question that can be illustrated by means of graph 4 
shown above is: how to strike the ‘right’ balance between centralised (or: public) approaches and decentralised (say: 
private) approaches. For many, this debate is about the balance between public and private investments in higher 
education. However, this debate is broader and includes the questions to what extent funding would have to be 
supply-driven versus demand-driven and whether it should be input-oriented or performance-based. These questions 
are highly ideological and political, depending as they do on what is ‘right’, ‘just’ and ‘what works’. Funding would 
have to achieve a multitude of goals, some of which were mentioned in our introduction section. At the same time 
the funding mechanism would have to be flexible enough to accommodate important global trends, such as 
individualisation, internationalisation/globalisation and the injection of (in particular, information and 
communications technology-driven) technologies. 
 
In the Netherlands, very heated debates every now and then are held on the topic of vouchers and demand-driven 
funding (situated in quadrant 4 of graphs 3 and 4). Demand-driven funding is often promoted as a means to inject 
more incentives towards increasing responsiveness and efficiency into the system. It permits student choice to drive 
the funding of higher education providers. The crucial aspect of the voucher idea is freedom to choose and this, 
according to Barr (1998), would require that education is not just provided by public institutions but also – or at least 
in part – by private institutions. So, students would be allowed to hand over their vouchers to private institutions that 
– just like the public ones – comply with minimum quality standards. Thus student choice becomes the key element 
in a system where students ‘vote with their feet’ and the outcome of their search for the highest value for money 
determines which institutions receive public funds for teaching.  
 
Voucher systems are only one of the options that can be brought forward for the funding of higher education. The 
‘best’ option will depend on the goals to be achieved and the question how the system that is in place is actually 
working towards those goals. The goals and conditions to be attached to a new funding model that came up in 
discussions on the future of the Dutch higher education funding system (see Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2002) were 
many and, indeed, impossible to achieve simultaneously. In any case, we are mentioning them here because we 
think they are relevant for discussions in other countries as well.  
 
1. The funding model should underpin an open higher education system with equal opportunities (a ‘level playing 
field’) for all providers, be they public or private. 
2. The system has to lead to an adequate balance between the various parties (‘stakeholders’) involved (i.e. 
students, government, business) when it comes to the responsibility for resourcing and deriving benefits from 
the system. In other words costs and benefits need to be shared. 
3. Funding has to enhance (competition on the basis of) quality. 
4. The system will have to be prepared for increased competition (for students, research contracts) from abroad. 
5. Funding will have to allow for a more diverse higher education system with varied institutions and programs 
that differ in terms of length, quality and method of delivery. 
6. Students would have to be able to choose, be mobile, and collect their credits from a wide set of programs and 
providers, without barriers between institutions. 
7. The funding mechanism would have to enable the generation of additional private revenues (from students, their 
parents, employers, and business). 
8. Programs that have an important social or cultural value should continue to be supported. 
9. Funding mechanisms should not erect financial barriers for qualified students to enrol in the institution of their 
own choice. Financial support to students will guarantee equal access opportunities for all. 
 
We will not discuss the details for each of the nine individual goals and conditions. Many are self-explanatory, but 
we do like to pay attention to the ‘level playing field’ condition mentioned first. A number of developments lead to 
the blurring of boundaries between universities and other providers of tertiary (i.e. not necessary higher) education. 
One can point to various forms of co-operation between institutions. Also the distinction between private (i.e. 
unfunded) providers and public providers is becoming less clear. On top of that, due to the introduction of 
accreditation mechanisms the focus, these days, is on the degree program, its contents and its quality. And it is 
increasingly less relevant who supplies a particular program.  
 
The other goal/condition we would like to mention is the seventh: the potential for increasing private contributions. 
The private returns from a university degree and the low price elasticity of demand are often put forward as 
justification for increased revenues. However, not all degrees are the same. A bachelor degrees differs from a 
master’s degree. A degree in economics is different from a degree in humanities; a degree from a teacher training 
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college is different from a degree from a law school. In other words, classifying degree programs according to their 
private and their social return would seem like the proper way to start a discussion on raising fees or, looking at the 
other side of the coin, determining the degree to which the government should be involved in funding particular 
degree programs (see Jongbloed, 2003). In fact this issue touches on the same topics to be considered under 
condition #2 (public and private responsibilities for higher education and research). One is immediately running into 
the problems surrounding the measurement of private rates of return and – even more difficult – social rates of 
return. Raising fees, or indeed, allowing them to be different across degree programs, can only be justified towards 
customers (students) in situations (i.e. markets) where quality differences and price differences are transparent. 
 
Faced with these nine constraints and the underlying practical problems of measurement and implementation, the 
discussion (still unresolved) in the Netherlands led to the construction of three funding arrangements for the funding 
of teaching in universities and polytechnics (the funding of research was considered in a separate exercise). The 
arrangements may be placed in the classification scheme (graphs 3 and 4) shown above. They include several 
ingredients, some of which have been selected to make the contrasts between the options as clear as possible. The 
ingredients are stated in terms of: (1) steering philosophy, (2) the mechanisms adopted for allocating public funds 
for teaching, (3) private (i.e. fee-based) funding, and (4) the student support system.  
 
Table 2 below shows the three different arrangements. The options each take off from a different idea about who 
takes the lead in shaping the higher education landscape. The leading actor is, respectively, (1) the student, (2) the 
higher education institution, or (3) the government.  
 
 
Table 2:  Funding methodologies: three options 
 
Student centred Supply driven Program oriented 
Steering 
philosophy 
• Demand-driven 
• Freedom to choose 
• Open system 
• Customer-oriented 
• Conditions w.r.t. program 
coherence and quality  
• Government organises / 
oversees quality control and 
information supply 
• Supply driven 
• Providers take the lead 
• Publicly funded versus non-
funded providers 
• Competition on the basis of 
prices and quality offered by 
providers 
• Selection of students 
• Steering through programs 
• Government chooses which 
programs to fund and which not 
to fund 
• Open system (level playing 
field) 
• Protection of socially relevant 
programs 
Funding 
method 
• Limited number of credits 
(vouchers)  per student  
• Vouchers to be used only for 
accredited (parts of) programs 
• Formula funding of degrees 
(completions / credits)  
• Contract funding (tenders) 
• All providers (public, private) 
can compete for contracts 
Tuition 
fees 
• Fees partly covered by 
vouchers 
• Differentiated fees  
• Fees determined by provider 
• Top up fees (differentiated 
fees) 
• Fee levels depend on provider 
strategy & competition 
• Fees determined by quality, 
program length, etc. 
• Uniform fees for publicly 
funded programs (gov’t sets 
fees) 
• Other programs charge 
differential fees 
Student 
support 
• Student support distinguishes 
between cost of living and 
program cost: 
• Grant + loan for program  
• Grant + loan for cost of living 
• Extra entitlements (vouchers) 
for disadvantaged students / 
programs 
• Providers supply student 
support package 
• Package based on merit & 
need of student 
• Support can be combined with 
job or family activities 
• Extra scholarships offered by 
employers 
• Providers offer loans through 
private banks  
• Many options fit this scenario 
• Option: only grants for publicly 
funded programs 
• Otherwise: loans provided by 
gov’t 
Source: Jongbloed & Vossensteyn (2002) 
 
The student-centered option is in fact the most demand-driven system; it was already discussed in the previous 
section. Students choose which providers receive public money. Any differences in costs across programs are 
expressed through differential fees. Institutions are competing for customers, for instance by delivering tailor-made 
programs.  Flexibility is key. 
 
In the second, provider-driven option, the strategy of the higher education provider is of the utmost importance. 
Institutions try to get their programs accredited in order to qualify for public funding and try to distinguish 
themselves from other providers by means of their program supply. The institution generates more resources when it 
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is more successful in delivering graduates and setting its fees at levels that are acceptable for students. This supply-
oriented option may be placed in the south-east part of graph 3. 
 
In the program-oriented option the degree of planning by the government is the largest. On the basis of economic 
and social reasons (e.g. rates of return, labour market needs, cultural/regional diversity) the government decides 
about the number of student places to fund. Unfunded programs are left to the market. All providers can compete for 
contracts to deliver a specified amount of graduates. Programs like that provide a high private rate of return to the 
student (once graduated) will receive no (or hardly any) direct government funding; possible only in the shape of 
student support for the students in it. 
 
 
5. Discussion/conclusions: on trade-offs, dilemmas and level playing fields 
 
An ideal funding system does not exist. It all depends on the goals that policy-makers would like to achieve on 
behalf of students and society in general. The three options presented here all score differently on the (nine) 
conditions specified by policymakers. On top of that, the success of any system will also depend heavily on the 
amount of funds invested in it from public and private sources. When it comes to private revenues, all three options 
allow for additional private income to be derived from student fees. However, this depends crucially on the 
government allowing institutions to set fees (either up to specified levels or without any bounds whatsoever). In the 
third (program-oriented) option the government keeps an eye on fees charged for students in publicly funded 
programs – these are programs where the ratio between social rates of return are substantially higher than private 
returns. To give an example, programs in the bachelor phase of higher education are funded (and protected), while 
fees for higher degree (master’s) programs in vocational subjects are deregulated. Another example is the public 
funding of teacher training programs. Student places in this socially important area may be funded while students in 
fields like economics or law receive far less public funding. 
 
It will be clear that it is possible to make a mix of elements from all three funding models in order to meet a 
particular set of priority goals and conditions. However, for reasons of clarity we have chosen to combine the 
ingredients in the way that best fits the respective steering philosophies.  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of the three options shown here may be discussed from the perspective of the 
main stakeholders:  
(1) students,  
(2) institutions,  
(3) government/taxpayer,  
(4) employers of graduates.  
 
It would go too far to discuss all options from the perspective of these four stakeholder groups. The only remarks we 
are making at this point are that students would seem to be served best in the first option, where flexibility and 
opportunities for lifelong learning are the greatest. Institutions have the most stability in the second option, they can 
plan on the basis of a transparent funding system and their own choice of profile and programs. However, both in 
the first and second option there is a chance that programs confronted with low student demand will suffer. 
Employers will be worried that in option 1, program coherence gets lost in the battle for students. In option 2 
providers will remain autonomous and seek more co-operation with private business to provide strong programs and 
attractive student aid packages. Society would see its supply of graduates in important fields like health, teacher 
training, and other public services guaranteed by means of a planned and accountable system of publicly-supported 
programs.  
 
On the topic of injecting more private money into higher education we would like to state that students (and/or their 
parents) and private businesses are more inclined to spend money on universities when they have the feeling that 
their demands are met more closely. The chances for this to happen are far greater in a deregulated system that 
allows institutions and students, respectively institutions and businesses, to work more closely together and decide 
on program content or research directions without government interference. In other words, options 1 and 2 would 
seem candidates for a higher education funding system that generates more funding from the private sector. In 
option 1, private contributions can be combined with vouchers to pay for tailor-made courses. In option 2, 
institutions with strong teaching and research profiles seek closer collaboration with private business to enhance the 
quality of degree programs and research programs and to offer student support packages to students that study in 
particular fields. 
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The three options, in the (intentionally, highly market-oriented) way they are presented here, point to a couple of 
trade-offs and dilemmas that will occur in any discussion about the reform of higher education funding. But first of 
all, what the options show is a development with some of the following characteristics of the higher education 
system emerging:  
(1) an increased competition between (private and public) providers 
(2) the need for differentiation and the building up of a strong institutional profile/image 
(3) the rise of strategic alliances (mergers) between institutions 
 
What also becomes clear is that some critical issues have to be dealt with: 
(1) the need for increased transparency and reliable information about what is on offer 
(2) the need to increase our understanding of the public benefits and private benefits that derive from higher 
education 
(3) the need to make a distinction between bachelor’s programs and master’s programs when it comes to the 
funding of teaching. 
 
The dilemmas we encounter are about the lines (or borders) to be drawn – finance-wise – between, first of all, 
publicly funded providers/programs and non-funded (i.e. private) institutions/programs, and, secondly, initial 
higher/tertiary education and post-initial higher/tertiary education. Some of the dilemmas touch on the level-playing 
field discussion, in which it is often stated that private providers should have the same privileges (and access to 
public funds) as public providers. In other words, regulation (or rather: re-regulation), such as the conditions 
attached to public funding, student support and accreditation, are at stake here.  
 
This automatically takes us back to the (public–private) debate on demand-driven versus supply-driven funding and 
the conditions under which a demand-driven system with more student-centred financing of higher education could 
work. The potentially negative effects of demand-driven funding have to be prevented by accompanying policy 
measures in the field of funding, accreditation, and protection of culturally important subjects. 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of advantages and disadvantages of demand-driven (say, voucher) funding. 
 
Table 3:  Pros and cons of vouchers 
pros cons 
• strengthening student choice 
• strengthening responsiveness to customers 
• increase in diversity of educational services (both 
in delivery methods and range of programmes) 
• strengthening flexibility in learning routes 
• increase in efficiency of provision 
• increase in quality of provision 
• increase in private contribution to cost of 
education (‘topping up’ the voucher) 
• greater opportunities for lower income families 
and minorities 
• inability of clients to assess information on the 
quality of education 
• geographical factors will limit choice  
• over-subscription will require rationing (selection) 
and favour high-income families 
• high administrative complexity (and costs) 
• need for government regulations to protect 
subjects, individuals, quality and equity 
• large variations in enrolment and funding may lead 
to under-utilisation of capital and insecure jobs 
for teachers 
• programmes with high cultural value but with 
small enrolments will be forced to close 
• if used to the full, vouchers lead to additional 
government expenditures 
source: Jongbloed & Koelman (2000) 
 
The table points to some of the requirements that would need to be fulfilled in order for student-centred funding to 
work. Sceptics will immediately point out the need for the increased regulation called for by the introduction of a 
market-driven system – something that would seem contradictory: to create a market-like higher education system 
the government interferes heavily in the market in order to protect students, subjects and institutions.  
 
What we can learn from the above overview of funding trends and funding methodologies is that, before racing to a 
market-based reform along the lines suggested by the Economist in its analysis of problems in Western European 
higher education, it would seem important to first address the following questions: 
 
(1) what are today’s problems and bottlenecks that stand in the way of the realisation of public goals; and can 
that public goal (or good; externality) actually be quantified/approximated in some way?  
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(2) to what extent can students express their demand (and do they wish to do so; do they really vote with their 
feet if allowed to; do they act rationally)? 
(3) is there enough room for a market to emerge? (what about the freedom of entry for new 
providers/entrepreneurs; what if commercial providers would like to qualify for public funding?) 
 
The success of a policy of charging substantial fees from students depends crucially on accommodating policies in 
areas such as (the incentives to be included in) funding mechanisms, student support systems, quality assessment, 
availability of information, and opportunities for new education providers to enter the market for higher education. 
Only if, in agreement with other players, governments work on reforms in these fields will policies to increase 
private revenues for higher education have a chance to be successful. 
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